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THE UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE 
IN THE AMERICAN SECURITY STRATEGY
Introduction
There is a widespread notion among the American politicians and within the mili-
tary that the New Space Race is already underway. According to this line of think-
ing, some countries, most notably China and Russia, challenge the United States 
dominant position in the Earth’s orbit. Until recently, this position has given the 
United States unique capabilities which greatly facilitated not only the security 
of the United States but also contributed to the development of numerous civilian 
applications. These applications, in turn, have greatly benefi ted the U.S. economy 
and have proven extremely useful in the everyday life of the American citizenry. 
However, the narrative of the New Space Race on-the-move holds, the powerful 
contenders try to deprive the United States of its position in space and deny bene-
fi ts America reaps from the space exploration. That is why it is widely implicated 
that the United States must not only take part in this race, but an imperative to 
win it is almost existentially important. Although some scholars do not agree with 
that notion whatsoever1, this narrative is gradually more and more embedded in 
the American public discourse.
1 B. Charlton, The myth of the “new space race”, “The Space Review”, 25.11.2019, 
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3838/1 [accessed: 26.11.2019].
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An essential part of the argument mentioned above is the one about the 
security of the American space-related assets. It is often being repeated that 
Russia, China, and other unfriendly nations are developing a wide range of 
counter-space systems that are able to degrade the U.S. capabilities in space. 
Therefore, many politicians claim that the outer space has already been trans-
formed into the warfi ghting domain2 and the United States has to admit it and 
act accordingly. Among the measures implemented to address this problem, the 
separate service has recently been created within the U.S. military, the United 
States Space Force (USSF). It is tasked to combine space-related capabilities 
to form a unifi ed and so more eff ective service than the existing ones scattered 
across the armed forces.
This article depicts and assesses the primary rationale behind the deci-
sion to create USSF, against the broad background of the United States secu-
rity strategy with particular attention to the role of outer space in it. We will, 
therefore, fi rstly describe in brief the role of outer space in the security strategy 
of the United States. Secondly, we will present the current state and mission of 
the U.S. Space Force and its perspectives. And fi nally, we will address some 
controversies related to the creation of the new military branch.
Outer Space in the Security Strategy of the United States3
The United States is continuously pursuing the global strategy of active political 
engagement, and it means that all of the world’s regions and the global domains 
are within the sphere of the American interest. The general goal of this engage-
ment is to maintain worldwide political infl uence to promote broadly understood 
economic interest of the United States. The main instruments the United States 
uses to perform various global and regional policies are:
– economic might which is often utilized as a tool to maintain political infl u-
ence and thus to solidify long-term economic co-operation;
– so-called soft-power what means the power of attraction of the American 
economic and social model which makes countries and regions willingly 
align with the U.S. interest for their benefi t, and
– military strength, which is a vital tool aimed at securing the U.S. positions 
in the world against possible opposition which would try to use military 
coercion against the American interests.
2 See for example: C.T. Lopez, Shanahan: Space No Longer Peaceful, U.S. Department 
of Defense, 9.04.2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1810085/shanahan-
-space-no-longer-peaceful [accessed: 17.05.2020].
3 For further reference see on this issue see: M. Czajkowski, Przestrzeń kosmiczna w stra-
tegii bezpieczeństwa narodowego USA [Outer Space in the National Security Strategy of the USA], 
Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2020.
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From our point of view, the last category is the most important, as we ana-
lyze the security strategy of the United States. The U.S. military performs various 
duties and fulfi ls many tasks not only with regard to classic defensive functions of 
armed forces. Due to the geographical extent of American infl uence and interests, 
the military must perform a wide range of tasks, which include: 
– deterrence of potential aggression against the U.S. territory and the 
American interests abroad; this is a classic function of the armed forces 
but signifi cantly broadened, as it covers many regions and all of the glob-
al commons;
– defending against the aggression against the U.S. soil and overseas inter-
ests of the United States, what means executing combat missions when-
ever and wherever it is necessary due to character of the threat; again, it is 
a classic function of the military but signifi cantly expanded because of the 
global reach of the American infl uence and interests;
– extended deterrence, what means deterring potential off enders from ag-
gression against the U.S. allies and partners and defending them should 
deterrence fail; it is a necessary form of military activity, as the United 
States relies on the system of alliances and partnerships to maintain its 
global infl uence; this mission includes constant military co-operation and 
stationing of the American troops abroad on a permanent basis;
– support of the current foreign policy by manifestations of the political will, 
as armed forces stationed in various countries or regions are an indication 
of Washington’s intent and of the signifi cance of certain areas from the 
point of view of the United States interests; one of the most distinctive 
features of the U.S. armed forces, which is specifi cally important for this 
task is the mobility of combat units, especially sea- and air-borne, which 
are frequently used components of the political pressure exerted to achieve 
current goals4; the military is, therefore, an essential political argument, if 
necessary it even becomes the tool of coercion, as the U.S. is continuously 
ready to use the military force, and
– conducting policing, humanitarian and other non-combat actions; these 
missions include managing regions and global commons for the sake of 
stability, and it also contributes to the enhancement of the American soft-
power.
The abundance of the U.S. military installations of various kind in the 
world is, therefore, one of the essential measures of the American global en-
gagement, as the military is an indispensable instrument of Washington’s activi-
ties in various regions of the world and globally. These installations, located in 
countries and territories on every continent, contain vast quantities of stored war 
4 See representative examples: J. Masters, Sea Power: The U.S. Navy and Foreign Policy, 
Council on Foreign Relations, 19.08.2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sea-power-us-navy-
-and-foreign-policy [accessed: 20.08.2019].
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material, large numbers of personnel, and are equipped with a variety of weapons 
systems, including tactical nuclear weapons. The military units stationed abroad 
may, therefore, sustain long military campaigns thanks to this infrastructure and 
the capability to perform rapid build-up of forces in certain areas should the need 
arise. This attitude is also refl ected in the declared security doctrine of the United 
States, as it strongly underlines the notion of peace through strength.5
The fundamental condition for the realization of the tasks mentioned 
above is the common perception which persists in the world that the Ameri-
can military posture is credible. In practical terms, it means that the U.S. must 
maintain the capabilities of their forces which ensure overwhelming advantage 
over any possible opponent. But this does not imply a numerical advantage in 
planes, ships or personnel, because due to the global nature of the American en-
gagement, it would be an unbearable burden for the economy and society. The 
advantage stemming from the possession of a nuclear arsenal cannot be counted 
as well. Weapons of mass destruction are not an instrument of everyday foreign 
policy; they pose a deterrent to the existential threats but are not a tool to deal 
with day-to-day local tasks.
The solution is, of course, a technological advantage compounded with 
ability to redeploy large forces across the world rapidly. These traits of the Ameri-
can military allow it to fulfi l various tasks throughout the globe simultaneously, 
maintaining the force levels acceptable from the economic point of view. Thanks 
to the technological advantage and capability to deploy forces quickly to achieve 
a local concentration of combat units, the U.S. is able to conduct military cam-
paigns with very limited loses. The latter is one of the keys to understanding the 
American military posture. It not only means that losing soldiers as a result of 
enemy action is politically problematic at home. Equally important is, again, the 
economic factor. Signifi cant and frequent damages to installations and loses of 
the equipment would undermine economic foundations of the U.S. military as 
an instrument of the otherwise not militarized country. It means that the military 
expenditures cannot exceed the “reasonable” level of several per cent of the GDP.
One of the most important aspects of the American technological advan-
tage in the military sphere is that the U.S. forces wield several vital “force multi-
pliers”. These are operational concepts, forms of organization, and technologies 
which do not bring direct combat advantages but greatly enhance the eff ective-
ness of units in the fi eld. This way, an outcome of their operation is somewhat 
multiplied, what means that combat units may be several times more eff ective 
than similar ones without the “multipliers”. The most crucial force multipliers 
in the U.S. military are logistics, communications, positioning and intelligence 
gathering. These capabilities, when properly integrated, allow the relatively small 
5 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, Washing-
ton D.C., December 2017, s. 4, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Fi-
nal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf [accessed: 31.07.2018].
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American forces to execute worldwide combat and non-combat missions with 
great success and eff ectiveness, and with minimal loses.
What combines all those force multipliers is that they are much depended 
on space applications, what makes space systems some of the most valuable as-
sets as far as the American military advantage is concerned. Thus, the satellite 
systems and their unhampered use are crucial for the whole American security 
strategy. The same refers to the foreign policy, as it relies to a great extent on the 
unmatched military might and freedom to use it everywhere and anytime.
Space systems are force multipliers, because they enhance capabilities of 
armed forces and other institutions, allowing them to perform their duties much 
better. But the use of space systems not only directly enhances combat eff ective-
ness of the military units, but it also has an important political dimension. Firstly, 
by augmenting the capabilities of the armed forces which are also a political in-
strument, what we know already. And secondly, by enhancing the intelligence 
and communication capabilities which are often used for political purpose. Gen-
erally speaking, there are two essential features of the space systems as a force 
multiplier, which form its two main dimensions.
The fi rst dimension, clearly visible and often acknowledged, means a con-
siderable enhancement of the eff ectiveness of many military activities thanks to 
the support of the space systems. The missions performed within the realm of the 
security and outside it, are simply much more eff ective with space applications 
than without them. Space communications allow overcoming the geographical 
constraints that classic ground systems suff er and the limitations imposed by the 
characteristics of the atmosphere. Furthermore, Satellite positioning allows ships, 
planes, vehicles, individuals to obtain quick fi x of their position – this refers to 
guided munitions as well. And fi nally, space-borne surveillance and intelligence 
assets bypass natural geographical limitations and are not inhibited by state bor-
ders what multiply related capabilities.
In short, satellite technology is one of the main aspects of technological 
advantage that the United States enjoy over the world within the realm of secu-
rity, what refl ects on the eff ectiveness of foreign policy as well. This advantage 
manifests in multiple patterns related to the details of a particular mission, be it 
the region where it is executed or the objective of the mission. For example, the 
Russian Federation has built thousands of GPS jamming stations on its territory 
and excels with spoofi ng the positioning signals.6 Therefore, every military ac-
tion with the use of satellite navigation systems would be more diffi  cult against 
that country against the other, less advanced. The same refers to satellite surveil-
lance against international actors who possess sophisticated means of concealing 
and hiding of valuable objects. By the way, at this point we can see a signifi cant 
6 See for example: E. Groll, Russia Is Tricking GPS to Protect Putin, “Foreign Policy”, 
3.04.2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/03/russia-is-tricking-gps-to-protect-putin [accessed: 
10.09.2019].
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feature of space applications: many of their key parameters and modes of opera-
tion are well known to the adversaries who may take various actions to negate or 
limit space systems’ eff ectiveness.
The second dimension in which space-borne capabilities show their val-
ue as a force multiplier is the economic sphere. It means that the cost of the 
particular mission, be it the destruction of a single target or delivery of a bit 
of information, is lower due to the precision that space applications add to 
every activity. This aspect may be less visible, but still, it is crucial, as the cost 
of the overall American presence in the world must be kept within bearable 
limits. Otherwise, the United States could suff er from the economic burden 
of its global policies, what in turn would limit the scope of the engagement, 
thus diminishing the profi ts the U.S. gains from its world activity. An excellent 
example of how this advantage worked is the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The 
U.S. and its allies’ forces eff ectively annihilated the huge Iraqi army with the 
use of much smaller, but highly capable forces. Their eff ective operations were 
enhanced, among the others, by space systems, which allowed precise strike, 
eff ective navigation on the desert and unhampered tactical communication, not 
to mention reconnaissance and surveillance performed by imaging and signals 
intelligence satellites. Thanks to these capabilities, the victory against Iraq was 
achieved without high additional costs of the probably much longer campaign 
if it was conducted without them.
Summarizing to this point, we have to reiterate that space systems as 
a force multiplier or as force multipliers are crucial for the successful execution 
of the American military strategy. This effi  ciency, in turn, refl ects signifi cantly on 
the eff ectiveness of the overall foreign policy of the United States. Therefore, we 
can conclude that space applications form the backbone of the global reach of the 
U.S. armed forces. They also, to a great extent, facilitate the sustainable nature of 
the American engagement, as they contribute to the general military advantage 
of the United States. Without these systems operating smoothly and without in-
terruptions, the U.S. global posture would be signifi cantly diminished.
This brings us to the vital problem, already signalled above that this advan-
tage is increasingly contested. Other countries build their own space systems which 
emulate the American ones, and they are also designing and deploying the means 
to negate the U.S. space capabilities. It is therefore often argued that the Ameri-
can space “hegemony” is drawing to its end. The United States understands that, 
and many politicians and infl uential think-tanks repeatedly issue stern warnings 
that the American advantage is actually diminishing.7 One of the clear signs of 
the recognition of this fact is that the U.S. forces conduct extensive exercises 
7 See for example: G. Autry, S. Kwast, America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China, 
“Foreign Policy”, 22.08.2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/22/america-is-losing-the-second-
-space-race-to-china/ [accessed: 19.05.2020].
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in the environment in which at least some of satellite capabilities are negated, 
even though it brings signifi cant disturbances of the civil aviation.8
Therefore, in the United States, there is a multitude of activities, plans and 
strategies regarding enhancement of the positions in outer space. There are tech-
nology development programs, proposed changes in doctrine and training and 
organizational adjustments. One of these measures, which supposedly possess 
great potential, is the establishment of the United States Space Force.
Organization and Mission of the U.S. Space Force
The eff ort to establish new patterns of organizing the security-related space 
activities started formally in March 2018, when President Donald J. Trump offi  -
cially mentioned for the fi rst time the intent to establish the United States Space 
Force (USSF) as a separate branch of the military.9 However, the creation of 
the new military service is a prerogative of the Congress, so, before the Space 
Force has been created, some other organizational eff ort was set in motion in 
order to prepare the new institutions. 
In September 2018 Final Report on Organizational and Management 
Structure for the National Security Space Components of the Department of 
Defense10 was directed by Department of Defense (DoD) to the U.S. Congress. 
This document was intended to lay out a groundwork for the eff ort needed to 
establish the new branch of armed forces. Among the others, it envisioned the 
formation of several organizations, like Space Command, Space Operations 
Force and Space Development Agency. On the day of publication of this report, 
President Trump signed the directive which ordered the DoD to create these 
components within existing structures what did not require an authorization 
from the Congress.11
8 B. Carey, FAA Mulls Recommendations For Planned GPS Interference, Aviation Week 
Network, 1.08.2018. http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/faa-mulls-recommendations-
planned-gps-interference [accessed: 8.08.2018].
9 K. Johnson, Bad Idea: Confl ating the Space Force with NASA, CSIS, 21.12.2018, https://
defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-confl ating-the-space-force-with-nasa [accessed: 12.04.2020].
10 Final Report on Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security 
Space Components of the Department of Defense, Report to Congressional Defense Committees, 
U.S. Department of Defense, 9.08.2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/09/2001952764/-
1/-1/1/ORGANIZATIONAL-MANAGEMENT-STRUCTURE-DOD-NATIONAL-SECURITY-
SPACE-COMPONENTS.PDF [accessed: 14.08.2018].
11 President Donald J. Trump is Building the United States Space Force for a 21st Century 
Military, The White House, 9.08.2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefi ngs-statements/presiden-
t-donald-j-trump-building-united-states-space-force-21st-century-military/ [accessed: 14.08.2018].
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With the compliance with this decision the unifi ed combatant command, 
the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established in August 201912, 
with the United States Air Force (USAF) general (four-star) John W. Raymond 
as the commanding offi  cer (CO). This organization is a so-called force user, what 
means it is the commanding structure responsible for planning and conducting 
operations in the space domain. It does not include combat units or space sys-
tems, but it is tasked with coordinating operations with the use of systems and 
units while conducting space activities. Space assets necessary for the operations 
controlled by USSPACECOM are provided by other organizations which belong 
to military branches of the U.S. armed forces. This is how the U.S. forces are, 
with some exemptions, organized. The branches of military provide the training 
and sustainment of the units which are assigned to combatant commands for the 
purpose of individual operations.
The second of the new organizations designed to refurbish and augment 
national security-related space eff ort is the Space Development Agency (SDA), 
established in March 2019 within the Department of Defence.13 According to the 
initially stated intentions it was supposed to integrate all the research & devel-
opment eff ort related to military space activities. However, it has not happened 
to date, since many of the development programmes referring to the new space 
applications have remained in other branches and organizations.14 However, de-
spite initial doubts15, the SDA is currently gaining traction, as the organization is 
expected to launch its fi rst experimental satellite constellation in 2022. The novel 
system is supposed to be built very quickly and under entirely new operation-
al and organizational logic to bring unique capabilities for defence purposes.16 
12 Text of a Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of Defense Regarding the 
Establishment of the United States Space Command, The White House, 18.12.2018, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefi ngs-statements/text-memorandum-president-secretary-defense-regarding-
establishment-united-states-space-command/ [accessed: 24.07.2019]. 
13 A. Mehta, V. Insinna, Pentagon offi  cially stands up Space Development Agency, na-
mes fi rst director, “Defense News”, 13.03.2019, https://www.defensenews.com/space/2019/03/13/
pentagon-offi  cially-stands-up-space-development-agency-names-fi rst-director/ [accessed: 
15.03.2019].
14 N. Strout, Is the Space Development Agency here to stay?, C4ISRnet, 1.08.2019, https://
www.c4isrnet.com/battlefi eld-tech/space/2019/08/01/is-the-space-development-agency-here-to-
-stay/ [accessed: 3.08.2019].
15 See for example: V. Insinna, Two lawmakers raise alarms about new Space Develop-
ment Agency, “Defense News”, 17.04.2019, https://www.defensenews.com/space/2019/04/17/
two-lawmakers-raise-alarms-about-new-space-development-agency/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=Space%2004.17.19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%20
Space%20Report [accessed: 19.04.2019].
16 N. Strout, One military space agency’s plan for 1,000 new satellites by 2026, C4I-
SRNet, 21.01.2020, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefi eld-tech/space/2020/01/21/one-military-
space-agencys-plan-for-1000-new-satellites-by-2026/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=e-
mail&utm_campaign=Space%2001.22.19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%20Space%20
Report [accessed: 22.01.2020].
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However, it is not exactly clear if the SDA will retain its separate status after it 
is integrated into U.S. Space Force what is currently scheduled for October 1st, 
2022.17
The fi nal process of establishing of the USSF was enacted by the presi-
dential Space Policy Directive 4, on February 19th, 2019.18 Following substan-
tial preparatory eff ort, on December 17th, 2019 the United States Congress has 
adopted the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) for the FY 2020, which 
enabled the creation of the United States Space Force as a separate branch of the 
American military, located within the Department of the Air Force. However, no 
new billets were allowed for the new service19, as it was supposed to be formed 
of the units already existing within the other branches of the military. In fact, 
whole the Air Force Space Command, recently created within the USAF, has 
been redesignated and became the U.S. Space Force. On December 20th, 2019 the 
NDAA came into force with the presidential signature, and this date is considered 
as the day of birth of the novel service, which was given 18 months to achieve 
full operational capability. However, it does not mean that the units assigned to 
the USSF are not functional – since they have been transferred from the other 
services, they maintain full operational capabilities.
The commanding offi  cer of the USSF is titled the Chief of Space Opera-
tions (CSO), and he or she is one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . This post has been 
assigned to the U.S. Space Command CO, general Raymond, who has since that 
moment held these two positions. It is worth to notice that this solution links 
a unifi ed combatant command (USSPACECOM) with a military branch (USSF) 
closer than it is in the case of other services and commands, save the U.S. Special 
Operations Command which is simultaneously a “force trainer”, “force provider” 
and force user.
The U.S. Space Force is composed of two commands, Space Operations 
Command and Space and Missile Systems Center.
Space Operations Command (SpOC), previously 14th Air Force within the 
U.S. Air Force Space Command, is responsible for the organization, training, 
equipping, command & control, and employment of space systems. It is, there-
fore, a force provider and force trainer, particularly for the U.S. Space Command, 
17 V. Insinna, Space Development Agency on track to become part of Space Force in 2022, 
director says, “Defense News”, 21.01.2020, https://www.defensenews.com/space/2020/01/21/
space-development-agency-on-track-to-become-part-of-space-force-in-2022-director-says/?utm_
source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Space%2001.22.19&utm_term=Edito-
rial%20-%20Military%20Space%20Report [accessed: 22.01.2020].
18 Text of Space Policy Directive-4: Establishment of the United States Space Force, 
The White House, 19.02.2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/text-space-policy-
directive-4-establishment-united-states-space-force/ [accessed: 24.07.2019].
19 J. Gould, Congress adopts defense bill that creates Space Force, “Defence News”, 
17.12.2019, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/12/17/congress-adopts-defense-bill-
that-creates-space-force/ [accessed: 3.04.2020].
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which, let us reiterate, is a force user. SpOC delivers a wide range of services 
to combatant commanders, like ground-based early warning (21st Space Wing), 
space launch operations (30th and 45th Space Wings), control of satellite systems 
(50th Space Wing), space-based early warning (460th Space Wing), and opera-
tional control (614th Air Operations Center). SpOC also provides a headquarters 
for the core USSPACECOM subordinate, the Combined Force Space Component 
Command (CFCSS), which executes tactical control of the U.S.-led multinational 
space operations.
The second of the USSF commands, the Space and Missile Systems Center 
(SMC) is, according to its own declarations,
[…] the center of technical excellence for developing, acquiring, fi elding and sustaining 
military space systems. SMC’s mission is to deliver resilient and aff ordable space capabili-
ties […] responsible for on-orbit check-out, testing, sustainment and maintenance of mili-
tary satellite constellations and other Department of Defense space systems.20
Thus, the SMC activities range from managing the GPS, to military com-
munications satellite constellations, to meteorological, and infrared observation 
systems to space launch systems and space situational awareness capabilities. 
The SMC consists of several directorates21 which perform its core duties and is 
hosted by 61st Air Base Group, the unit which operates Los Angeles Air Base 
where SMC is located.
The FY 2021 budget request22 for the U.S. Space Force provides that it 
should be funded with over 15 billion USD, transferred from the U.S. Air Force, 
for operations, maintenance, R&D, test, evaluations, etc., plus almost 10 billion 
USD of personnel costs. Additionally, roughly 0.5 billion is drafted for the es-
tablishment and maintenance of the USSF infrastructure consisting of a head-
quarters and fi eld centres. An essential feature of the Space Force is that it has 
been given strong independent acquisition powers. By October 1st 2022, the re-
cently created post, the assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition 
and integration (ASAF/SP) will become service acquisition executive (SAE).23 
20 Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, 2.07.2018, https://www.
losangeles.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/343702/space-and-missile-systems-center/ [acces-
sed: 4.04.2020].
21 For more information see: Units, Los Angeles Air Force Base, https://www.losangeles.
af.mil/Units/ [accessed: 4.04.2020].
22 All the following numbers according to: Defense Budget Overview; Irreversible Imple-
mentation of the National Defense Strategy, Offi  ce of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptrol-
ler)/Chief Financial Offi  cer, February 2020 (revised 13.05.2020), https://comptroller.defense.gov/
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf [acces-
sed: 3.04.2020].
23 E. Lofgren, Will the Space Force control its own destiny?, “Defence News”, 26.12.2019, 
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/12/26/will-the-space-force-control-
its-own-destiny/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Space%20
01.08.19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%20Space%20Report [accessed: 12.04.2020].
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This way there will be two separate SAEs within the Department of the Air Force, 
one for the Air Force, another for the Space Force. Note, that the Department 
of the Navy has at its disposal only one SAE who serves both the Navy and the 
Marines. These institutional arrangements give the USSF very good prospect for 
rapid development.
At present, there are 16 000 people assigned to the U.S. Space Force, 
who was transferred there with the Air Force Space Operations Command.24 In 
the future, more servicemen and civilians would follow with the reassignment 
of the next space-related units from other services. But, as we have already 
mentioned, the current legislation does not allow USSF to hire new people, as 
no new billets were created for the new service. It is because Congress does not 
want to witness a steep rise in military spending due to the creation of the new 
branch od military.25
The general idea which led to the establishment of the U.S. Space Force 
was to combine space assets, until now under the control of several branches of 
the military, into one unifi ed service. It is often argued that this transformation 
would facilitate more eff ective use of existing resources and capabilities, bet-
ter contingency planning, and more effi  cient training. Furthermore, the holistic 
perspective on a range of novel technologies would also prove more eff ective 
for the development of the new, unique capabilities which are necessary if the 
United States is to retain the qualitative advantage in the space domain. The 
doctrine of the use of space capabilities would also become more coherent if 
developed by a single, specialized body. Thus, the unifi ed Space Force is sup-
posed to emerge as America’s sole arm in space, and replace several organi-
zations belonging to the other branches military, along with several separate 
agencies, which, until now, have pursued much less coordinated policy. This 
argument is acknowledged not only by politicians and many in the military but 
also by some of the leading analysts.26
But the desired and expected changes along the logic depicted above have 
not been executed to the full extend yet. According to the current legislation, only 
the Air Force units have been transferred to the USSF when the USAF Space 
Command has become the U.S. Space Force. The NDAA for FY 2020 did not 
make either the Army or the Navy transfer their units engaged in space activities; 
24 What’s the Space Force, United States Space Force, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-
-Us/FAQs/Whats-the-Space-Force [accessed: 3.04.2020].
25 J. Gould, V. Insinna, Congress creating Space Force with limited headroom, “Defence 
News”, 10.12.2019, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/12/10/congress-creating-space-
force-with-limited-head-room/ [accessed: 2.04.2020].
26 See for example: T. Harrison, Why We Need a Space Force, CSIS, October 2018, http://
defense360.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Harrison_Endgame_D360_.pdf [accessed: 
10.11.2018].
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the two branches are only supposed to be “partners” for the USSF.27 It indi-
cates that rapid expansion of the Space Force capabilities is not envisioned, as 
there is no clear sign that any additional organization would be moved from 
other branches to the Space Force. Congress adopted this cautious approach 
because some infl uential fi gures believed that quick creation of the novel and 
very complicated organization would be diffi  cult and too expensive. Therefore, 
the lawmakers opted for the gradual approach28 to the establishment of the new 
branch and the step-by-step expanding of its capabilities and responsibilities. 
That is why, there is also no intention whatsoever to subordinate the National 
Reconnaissance Offi  ce (NRO), a powerful agency which is responsible for the 
vast chunk of the space surveillance, to the USSF. Furthermore, the U.S. Spe-
cial Operations Command intends to establish its own presence in outer space29; 
if it happens more military organizations will be active in Earth’s orbit, not less.
Summarizing, it is currently unclear if the Space Force will actually evolve 
into a full-fl edged branch of the military. As of now, it still represents not much 
more than only a renamed part of the USAF. Thus, it may very well be reabsorbed 
into the Air Force, if it fails to prove that a separate branch is essential to fulfi ll-
ing assigned tasks.30 Furthermore, the SDA is supposed to be subordinated to the 
USSF and form an important part of it, but it is still a separate organization – the 
process of its absorption may be reversed if it is deemed the better solution. The 
Space Force must also create its specifi c organizational culture which would 
serve as guidelines for its operation and development as a separate service.31 
All in all, the USSF has to prove that it is more than just a part of Donald 
Trump’s virtual reality and that its creation brings value added to the overall 
security of the United States.
27 V. Insinna, May the Space Force be with you. Here’s what we know about the US mi-
litary’s newest service, “Defense News”, 20.12.2019, https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-
-news/2019/12/21/may-the-space-force-be-with-you-heres-what-we-know-about-the-us-militarys-
newest-service/ [accessed: 22.12.2019].
28 L. Hudson, Introducing U.S. Space Force, Aviation Week Network, 23.01.2020, https://
aviationweek.com/defense-space/introducing-us-space-force?elq2=f8915ad7b3d54ba3b3d-
54d61b648b649 [accessed: 25.01.2020].
29 N. Strout, Special Operations Command is diving into space, C4ISRNet, 6.06.2020, 
https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/06/06/special-operations-command-is-
diving-into-space/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Space%20
06.10.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%20Space%20Report [accessed: 8.06.2020].
30 J. Hickman, The US Space Force’s long war, “The Space Review”, 6.04.2020, https://
www.thespacereview.com/article/3914/1 [accessed: 10.04.2020].
31 J. Anthony, In search of a space culture, “The Space Review”, 2.12.2019, https://www.
thespacereview.com/article/3841/1 [accessed: 12.12.2019].
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Conclusions
At fi rst glance, it seems logical that a unifi ed organization tasked to prepare and 
conduct security-related activities in space should be established. U.S. Space 
Force as a force provider and force trainer, with conjunction with the U.S. Space 
Command as a force user, looks well suited to become a single, and ultimately 
highly eff ective space arm of the United States. The gradual approach to the crea-
tion of the novel branch is also promising, as it should facilitate smooth develop-
ment and allow to avoid cost overruns.
This crucial argument is, however, debatable. All of the current space 
activities are of a supportive nature, and there is virtually no space operation 
which is not closely tied to the operations on Earth. No space combat craft 
designed to in-orbit warfare is to be deployed in the near future. Satellite 
systems only provide means of surveillance, positioning, and communica-
tions and serve as an information source for combatant commanders and other 
governmental institutions. Every one of these bodies has specifi c needs and 
modes of operations stemming from their specifi c tasks. If they lose their em-
bedded space capabilities, they risk that their needs will not be met in full by 
the organization concentrated on a more general approach. With those facts 
in mind, the creation of single space service seems a much less obviously ef-
fective solution. This obstacle may hamper and even reverse the development 
of the USSF, as this organization may simple not be able to fi nd suffi  cient and 
separate mission for itself.
Furthermore, analysts underscore that relatively quick, even if gradual, 
creation of such a huge organization will not solve problems of space security; 
even more extended procedure should be implemented instead.32 Accordingly, 
some politicians believe that the Space Force “[…] is […] just another bureau-
cracy […]”33, suggesting that the novel branch is only a new label for already 
existing structures. Other analysts point out that the exact shape of organiza-
tion eff ort directed to augment U.S. Space capabilities and secure their unham-
pered use does not matter a lot; the essence of the eff ort, the understanding of 
the threat, and proper actions against it are what is really important.34 Others 
argue that from the point of view of international security, it is necessary rather 
32 K. Johnson, Why a Space Force Can Wait, CSIS, October 2018, http://defense360.csis.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Johnson_Endgame_D360_.pdf [accessed: 10.11.2018].
33 Adam Smith (D-Washington) in: E. Howell, US Space Force’s activities still mysterious 
despite House hearing, Space.com, 6.03.2020, https://www.space.com/space-force-mysterious-de-
spite-house-hearing.html [accessed: 7.03.2020].
34 B. Bahney, J. Pearl, Why Creating a Space Force Changes Nothing, “Foreign Aff airs”, 
26.03.2019, https://www.foreignaff airs.com/articles/space/2019-03-26/why-creating-space-force-
-changes-nothing [accessed: 30.03.2019].
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to promote co-operation in space than declare a race, competition, or struggle 
for dominance there.35
In conclusion, we should point out that the U.S. Space Force is still under 
construction and there is no clear and widely shared vision of its future. It will 
probably last for some time in its current shape, at least as a kind of experiment 
which could be terminated relatively easily if it does not fulfi l its promises. But 
it can also happen that Space Force will prove its value and the argument that the 
unifi ed service tasked with the full spectrum of space activities will be verifi ed 
positively. The fate of the SDA is somewhat another issue. If the doubt about the 
sense of the separate military branch persists, the agency may remain independ-
ent as it has already proven its ability to produce interesting concepts. On the 
other hand, if the USSF does mature, the SDA will surely become a part of it.
All in all, at the moment, it is very diffi  cult to predict the fate of the United 
States Space Force. Many logistic, technical, and operational obstacles may ob-
struct its development. The profound changes may also come with a possible 
change of the primary occupant of the White House. The new president may have 
the other vision for organization of space eff ort what could bring the swift demise 
of the novel service.
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The United States Space Force 
in the American Security Strategy
It is often being argued that Russia, China, and other unfriendly nations are developing a wide range 
of counter-space systems that are able to degrade the U.S. capabilities in space. Among the other 
measures to address this problem, the separate service has recently been created within the U.S. 
military, the United States Space Force. It is tasked to combine space-related capabilities to form 
a unifi ed and so more eff ective service than the existing ones scattered across the armed forces. This 
article depicts and assesses the primary rationale behind the decision to create USSF, against the 
broad background of the United States security strategy with particular attention to the role of outer 
space in it. We will, therefore, fi rstly describe in brief the role of outer space in the security strategy 
of the United States. Secondly, we will present the current state and mission of the U.S. Space Force 
and its perspectives. And fi nally, we will address some controversies related to the creation of the 
new military branch.
Key words: USA, space security, U.S. Space Force, security strategy, outer space, international 
security, international relations
Siły Kosmiczne Stanów Zjednoczonych 
w amerykańskiej strategii bezpieczeństwa
Często argumentuje się, że Rosja, Chiny oraz inne nieprzyjazne USA państwa rozwijają różne 
środki służące zanegowaniu amerykańskich zdolności do działania w przestrzeni kosmicznej. Obok 
innych działań nakierowanych na przeciwstawienie się temu zagrożeniu, niedawno powołano Siły 
Kosmiczne Stanów Zjednoczonych jako osobny rodzaj sił zbrojnych. Ich zadaniem jest połączenie 
systemów kosmicznych działających na rzecz bezpieczeństwa narodowego w jeden, zunifi kowa-
ny, a zatem bardziej efektywny podmiot niż w przypadku rozrzucenia tych systemów po różnych 
rodzajach sił zbrojnych. Artykuł opisuje i ocenia podstawowe założenia stojące za tą decyzją na 
szerokim tle strategii bezpieczeństwa Stanów Zjednoczonych, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem 
roli przestrzeni kosmicznej. Dlatego w pierwszej kolejności krótko omówiono rolę przestrzeni ko-
smicznej w strategii bezpieczeństwa USA, a następnie przedstawiono aktualny stan i zadania Sił 
Kosmicznych USA. Na koniec odniesiono się do niektórych kontrowersji związanych z utworze-
niem nowego rodzaju sił zbrojnych.
Słowa kluczowe: USA, bezpieczeństwo kosmiczne, Siły Kosmiczne USA, strategia bezpieczeń-
stwa, przestrzeń kosmiczna, bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, stosunki międzynarodowe
